From diaspora to diaspora : the case of Transylvanian Saxons in Romania and Germany. by Koranyi, James & Wittlinger, Ruth
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
31 August 2012
Version of attached file:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Koranyi, James and Wittlinger, Ruth (2011) ’From diaspora to diaspora : the case of Transylvanian Saxons in
Romania and Germany.’, Nationalism and ethnic politics., 17 (1). pp. 96-115.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2011.550248
Publisher’s copyright statement:
This is an electronic version of an article published in Koranyi, James and Wittlinger, Ruth (2011) ’From diaspora to
diaspora : the case of Transylvanian Saxons in Romania and Germany.’, Nationalism and ethnic politics., 17 (1). pp.
96-115. Nationalism and ethnic politics is available online at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/openurl?genre=articleissn=1353-7113volume=17issue=1spage=96
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 1 
From Diaspora to Diaspora: The Case of Transylvanian Saxons in 
Romania and Germany 
 
 
This paper will investigate the relationship between Transylvanian Saxons 
(Siebenbürger Sachsen) and their perceived “external homeland”. The 
authors will consider the history of German minorities in East-Central 
Europe and, more specifically, will briefly outline the history of 
Transylvanian Saxons. Against this backdrop, this paper will examine the 
changing nature of minority policies promoted by the Federal Republic of 
Germany until the present day, whilst juxtaposing this with Transylvanian 
Saxon discourses on identity and nationhood. In so doing, this paper will 
argue that the discrepancy between the mutual expectations of the FRG and 
Transylvanian Saxon émigrés became very pronounced after 1989. This then 
has led to what appears to be the end of the Saxon community, as émigrés 
have found themselves torn between assimilation and a longing for a return 
to Transylvania.  
 
After an overview of the German diaspora in East-Central Europe and parts of the former 
Soviet Union, we will briefly provide the relevant historical background for the case 
study of this article – the Transylvanian Saxons – from their arrival in Romania in the 
twelfth century until the fall of communism at the end of the 1980s. A discussion of West 
Germany’s external minority policy after 1945 will then show how the continued 
application of ius sanguinis and the realities of the Cold War order fostered a relationship 
between the Federal Republic and its diaspora in Romania which allowed Transylvanian 
Saxons to cultivate notions of an “external homeland” that encouraged its diaspora to 
return “home”.  
The article will then look at contemporary issues. It will examine the changes to 
Germany’s external minority policy in the post-Cold War period and analyse the effects 
of the immigration and citizenship reforms from the 1990s onwards on this group. In 
particular it will chart the shift away from Germany’s welcoming stance towards ethnic 
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Germans abroad to a notion of Germanness no longer solely based on ethnicity. Against 
this backdrop, this article will then highlight the emerging disconnect between 
Transylvanian Saxon immigrants and German society as ideas of identity, citizenship, 
and memory cultures differed between the host society and the new migrants, with the 
result that a reimagining of their former homeland – Romania – as their new “external 
homeland” has been taking place.  
 
 
The German diaspora in East-Central Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union 
 
Apart from a small number of countries in Western Europe (Denmark, Belgium, France 
and Italy), the German diaspora can be found in most Eastern and Central European 
states as well as in some of the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Ethnic 
German minorities have lived – and albeit in much reduced numbers still live – in 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Moldova, 
Ukraine, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
As Stefan Wolff has pointed out, the reasons for the historical and continued 
presence of ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe are due to three at times 
interrelated processes of conquest and colonization, migration and border changes. 
German settlers, for instance, moved to Bohemia (now Czech Republic) and parts of 
what is now Romania (Transylvanian Saxons) as colonizers in the 12
th
 and 13
th
 centuries. 
There were also mass migrations of German colonizers to the Russian Empire, invited by 
Catherine the Great in the 18
th
 century, and of Banat Swabians who in the 18
th
 century 
moved to what is now western Romania. The existence of German minorities in Eastern 
and Central Europe due to border changes, on the other hand, is largely a phenomenon of 
the 20
th
 century and a result of the new political order which emerged at the end of the 
two world wars.
1
  
The situation of these ethnic German minorities became particularly difficult in 
the 20
th
 century. In the interwar period and during the Second World War, many of the 
German minorities throughout Europe became radicalized and were instrumentalized by 
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the Third Reich as contributors towards its plans for German hegemony in Europe. This 
was partly due to the fact that some governments, such as in Hungary, augmented the 
German minorities’ alienation by curtailing some of their rights, but also due to 
independent radicalization that took place within these ethnic German groups.
2
 In a 
largely undemocratic Europe, mutual aggression continued to encourage radicalization 
and further shifts to the right.  
As a result of Hitler’s aggressive expansionism and the Second World War, many 
ethnic Germans in Eastern and Central Europe faced expulsions towards the end of the 
war and its immediate aftermath. Several million ethnic Germans were expelled and fled 
from a number of countries in Eastern and Central Europe, e.g. Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania. As a response to Hitler Germany’s aggressive 
occupation of Eastern and Central Europe, in which ethnic Germans had at times played 
an instrumental role,
3
 ethnic Germans from a number of Central and Eastern European 
states were also deported to the Soviet Union and condemned to several years of forced 
labor there. The German minority in the Volga Region, for example, was collectively 
deported to Siberia and Central Asia as early as 1941, when Hitler invaded the Soviet 
Union and Stalin feared that ethnic Germans would show loyalty to Hitler and undermine 
the Soviet Union’s defense.  A second wave of deportations took place at the end of the 
war, with some only coming back as late as 1956. Experience and memory of privilege – 
enjoyed not just in the 20
th
 century under Hitler but also previously as colonizers – but, 
more importantly, experience and narratives of suffering towards the end of the Second 
World War and during the Cold War thus constituted key pillars on which the collective 
identity of these ethnic German groups was based and which provided the foundation for 
their relationship with the “homeland”. 
 
From privilege to oppression: The Saxon diaspora in Romania 
 
This article focuses specifically on Transylvanian Saxons (Siebenbürger Sachsen), as 
they represent an exceptional case study of a group that experienced a number of events 
and currents during the Cold War on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Whilst other ethnic 
German groups were present as expellees or refugees in the early Federal Republic and 
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thereafter, Transylvanian Saxons remained, by and large, in Romania until the latter 
stages and end of the Cold War. Moreover, considering their long-standing history in the 
region, it would thus seem likely that this group was able to develop a more autonomous 
identity (or indeed identities) relatively independent of the nineteenth century debates 
surrounding nation-building in Germany (and indeed Austria). Yet despite this 
geographical distance to the German Lands, Transylvanian Saxons maintained links in 
various guises, particularly from the sixteenth century onwards. In order to appreciate 
current identity debates within this community and in (West) Germany, it is imperative to 
offer a brief outline of the history of Transylvanian Saxons and thereby locate points of 
continuity and rupture.  
The Siebenbürger Sachsen first arrived in present-day Transylvania in the twelfth 
century as settlers from mainly the region of Moselle-Franconia in Western Germany.
4
 
Most academic literature on the topic suggests that the majority of early settlers colonized 
the area following a call by the Hungarian King Géza II (1141-1162) acting as 
“defenders” of Christianity and, later, of the Kingdom of Hungary.5 This position also 
guaranteed a set of privileges that lasted into the nineteenth century.
6
 However, it was a 
second wave of settlers in the sixteenth century – made up of former Hansa traders and 
other Burghers – that transformed Transylvania into a truly “modern” region.7 This wave 
of migration helped to cement the Saxon position within the flourishing financial sector 
and also led to the conversion of Saxons to Protestantism.
8
 This then determined 
Transylvania’s official makeup of society. Three distinct groups (Hungarians, Szekler, 
and Saxons) were recognized as nations (nationes), and were thus granted particular 
privileges.
9
 
 The rise of nationalism across the wider region in the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth century began to undermine the existing social order. In this environment, 
Saxons felt increasingly marginalized as their privileges were being gradually eroded 
from several quarters.
10
 The revolutions of 1848/49 did not result in any form of national 
emancipation for Transylvanian Saxons, in fact their special standing became rather more 
limited. Following the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867, aggressive Hungarian 
policies towards minorities and Magyarization policies undermined the rights of all 
minorities in the region.
11
 The established public body of the Universitas Saxonum, the 
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embodiment of Saxon privilege, was abolished in 1876, and it was perhaps as a result of 
this that the so-called Sachsentag (the Saxon assembly) voted in favor of Romanian 
unification with Transylvania in 1918 as a way of securing their rights.
12
 The Hungarian 
treatment of its minorities in the nineteenth century had alienated them to such an extent 
that any alternative to Hungarian rule seemed preferable to the status quo.  
  
See separate attachment 
                [Image 1: Unified Romania in the interwar period.] 
 
The early détente within the new state of Romania soon began to fall apart. While both 
Saxons and Swabians (Banater Schwaben) had hoped for a degree of autonomy in 
Romania, Romanian politicians introduced a more centralized state system using the 
French model as their prototype.
13
 During the interwar period, the Transylvanian Saxon 
community stood in-between the so-called bürgerliche Parteien (mainstream political 
parties) and the rising nationalist, fascist movements across Europe.
14
 Whilst still the 
subject of historical debate, the radicalization of Transylvanian Saxons occurred not 
merely as a result of the rise of the National Socialists in Germany and of the right in 
Romania during the 1930s, but also due to internal currents and processes.
15
  
The so-called Erneuerungsbewegung (rejuvenation movement) under the 
leadership of Friedrich Fabritius gained much popularity among Transylvanian Saxons 
and paved the way for the subsequently unconditional alliance of Saxons, and Swabians, 
with Nazi Germany.
16
 The Romanian German community thus became 
“gleichgeschaltet” (coordinated) with the Hauptamt Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (the 
central office for ethnic German matters) and the policies of the Third Reich.
17
 By the 
end of World War Two, approximately 54,000 ethnic Germans from Romania (Saxons 
and Swabians alike) had joined the Third Reich’s military force, the Waffen-SS, and 
many of those who survived ended up in prisoner of war camps in the Balkans and the 
Soviet Union.
18
 The end of the war therefore also marked the beginning of the dissolution 
of the Romanian German communities. 
 Of the 750,000 Germans living in present-day Romania at the beginning of the 
twentieth century roughly 250,000 were Saxons. Following World War Two, this figure 
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declined considerably.
19
 In January 1945, around 75,000 ethnic Germans between the 
ages of 17 and 45 were deported for up to five years to the Soviet Union to carry out what 
was called reconstruction work.
20
 Those Germans who stayed behind in Romania were 
also subjected to harassment and persecution in the immediate post-war period.
21
 
Romanian German property was expropriated and deportations within Romania 
continued right into the 1950s.
22
 
Despite some efforts by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s government (1948-1965) to 
reintegrate Saxons into Romanian society, the relationship between Saxons and 
Romanian society deteriorated further. With the ever-growing pressure of emigration 
from Romania to West Germany, the economic and political situation in Ceauşescu’s 
Romania (1965-1989), and the financial assistance offered by West Germany to 
Romanian Germans, the end of the Cold War culminated in the mass emigration of 
Saxons from Romania.
23
 At the height of German emigration between 1989 and 1991 
nearly 200,000 Germans in total left Romania, most of whom settled in the Federal 
Republic of Germany.
24
 While their integration into Germany has been far smoother than, 
for example, the Russlanddeutsche (Russian Germans) or indeed many non-ethnic 
German immigrants, their position in German society has left many of them in a void.
25
 
Far from “returning” to Germany, many Romanian Germans have experienced the 
disintegration of their original communities in Romania and have come to recognize that 
their image of Germany did not match the realities they encountered.  
 
A welcoming homeland? West Germany's external minority policy  
 
By 1950, around 12 million ethnic German refugees and expellees from Central and 
Eastern Europe had migrated to Germany, i.e. all occupation zones/both German states. 
Although there were some refugees and expellees in the Soviet zone/East Germany,
26
 the 
majority fought their way to the Western zones/the FRG, at least eventually. In 
proportion to the population as a whole, however, the East had 25% refugees and 
expellees whereas the West only had 16%. The refugees – who were after all fleeing from 
the advances of the Red Army – were unlikely to want to stay in areas that already were 
or were likely to come under Soviet control. Many of the refugees and expellees, whom 
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the Allies had assigned to live permanently in the GDR, thus decided to leave for the 
West while the border was still permeable, i.e. before the Wall was built in 1961. Even 
though their numbers caused significant pressure on scarce resources in the Soviet zone, 
particularly in the early years after the war, in absolute terms their numbers were much 
lower than in West Germany.  
Domestically, the main challenge for West Germany was the economic and social 
integration of these large numbers of migrants.
27
 Externally, however, the question was 
what status to grant the German diaspora in communist Eastern and Central Europe and 
parts of the Soviet Union. Should they be left to their own devices in states that became 
increasingly repressive or should the West German state acknowledge responsibility and 
show loyalty and obligation towards these ethnic Germans by offering them special 
conditions if they were willing and able to migrate or “return” to the Federal Republic? In 
view of the fact that the same issue also applied to millions of East Germans, it was rather 
convenient to continue in the tradition of a law from 1913 which based Germanness on 
descent rather than place of birth. Until the citizenship reforms in the 1990s, German 
citizenship was thus based on ethnicity and determined by descent. Ius sanguinis 
(contrary to ius soli, i.e. the place of birth determines nationality) as laid out in the 
Citizenship Act (Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz) of 1913, determined that only 
those with German parents qualified as Germans. The continued application of the 
principle of ius sanguinis thus allowed the Federal Republic (as it had the Weimar 
Republic and the Third Reich) to foster links with ethnic Germans living outside the West 
German nation-state, even though the possibilities were very restricted due to Cold War 
realities. It enabled the West German state – which, after all, claimed to be the sole 
legitimate successor of the Third Reich – to grant West German citizenship to GDR 
citizens and ethnic Germans from Eastern and Central Europe and parts of the former 
Soviet Union. The Basic Law of 1949 confirmed the perception of the nation based on 
ethnicity rather than common territory, as laid down in the Citizenship Act of 1913. 
Article 116, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law prescribed that “… a German within the 
meaning of this Basic Law is a person who possesses German citizenship or who has 
been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the boundaries of December 
31, 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German ethnic origin or as the spouse or descendant 
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of such person.” Together with the Expellee and Refugee Law (Bundesvertriebenen und 
Flüchtlingsgesetz) of 1953 and the Law on the Regulation of Questions of Citizenship 
(Gesetz zur Regelung von Fragen der Staatsangehörigkeit) of 22 February 1955, it 
stipulated that ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe but also Germans from 
the GDR would qualify for West German citizenship. 
As Rogers Brubaker has pointed out, three distinct German terms were used to 
distinguish between different ways of belonging to the German nation: formal state-
membership (Staatsangehörigkeit), participatory citizenship (Staatsbürgerschaft) and 
ethno-cultural nation-membership (Nationalität or Volkszugehörigkeit).
28
 This provided 
the main distinction between those Germans who belonged to the West German civic 
nation/state, those in the GDR, and those in former German territories or of German 
descent. For ethnic Germans who could claim Germanness by descent, this meant not 
only that they could gain formal-legal citizenship of the FRG but also financial support, 
as well as access to programs that would aid their integration. What this amounted to was 
that ethnic Germans could obtain West German citizenship without having been born 
there, ever having lived there, let alone having been a citizen of a German state or speak 
the language. Nevertheless, the communist threat, efforts by West German governments, 
particularly through Ostpolitik in the 1970s, and some ethnic German communities’ 
preparedness to imagine themselves as part of this mythical nation have resulted in a 
rather strong ethnic German identity in many communities in Eastern and Central 
Europe.  
The fact that the FRG needed to keep open the option of allowing resettlers from 
the GDR (Übersiedler) and East-Central Europe (Aussiedler) to move to West Germany 
and gain full citizenship, made it politically nearly impossible to change German 
citizenship laws before unification. It would have meant letting down those Germans in 
the GDR who were prevented from enjoying political liberties and the benefits of 
widespread affluence that increasingly characterized the Federal Republic and who 
suffered the consequences of German crimes committed between 1933 and 1945 much 
more than their Western co-nationals. Similarly, in the case of ethnic Germans in Central 
and Eastern Europe, it would have meant abandoning those people who were subjected to 
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discrimination, some of whom had even faced deportation and forced labor, due to their 
belonging to a perceived German ethnicity. 
Whereas the provision for ethnic Germans to be allowed to migrate from 
communist Eastern and Central Europe and be able to gain citizenship in the FRG was 
considered a human rights issue, offering it to East Germans who managed to leave the 
GDR also added (welcome) political pressure on the GDR, as evidenced in the exodus of 
GDR citizens via Hungary and German embassies in Eastern and Central Europe before 
the fall of the Wall in 1989.
29
 
West Germany’s commitment to ethnic Germans in Eastern and Central Europe in 
its external minority policy until 1989 can be interpreted in different ways. It can be seen 
as “Deutschtümelei” (the petty attempt at preserving an alleged German ethnicity), but it 
can also be seen as an acknowledgement of responsibility for the consequences of the 
Second World War, the suffering caused to these people towards the end of the war and 
its aftermath, and the way their status as victims was never really acknowledged in the 
context of the new Cold War realities. As Joyce Mushaben has pointed out, “the effective 
integration of countless co-ethnics prior to the 1990s owed more to Germany’s 
willingness to accept historical responsibility for WWII victims and its desire for 
reconciliation with neighboring states than to the binding influence of a unique 
Kulturnation.”30 At the same time, however, the continued application of ius sanguinis 
allowed the West German polity to deny other migrants citizenship status, for example 
the “guest workers” it had recruited in large number in the 1960s and 1970s.  This, in 
turn, helped to maintain the illusion which was reiterated well into the new millennium 
that (West) Germany was ‘not a country of immigration’ (kein Einwanderungsland). In 
reality, however, there was a considerable number of immigrants without an ethnic 
German background who were unable to obtain German citizenship. This did not result in 
their departure but merely in a degree of legal uncertainty over their continued stay.
31
 
In summary, the main focus of West Germany’s relationship with ethnic German 
communities in Eastern and Central Europe was to allow as many ethnic Germans as 
possible to migrate to West Germany. Before Germany’s new citizenship law of 1993 
made migration to the Federal Republic much more difficult, just over 3 million ethnic 
Germans (3,067,730) had migrated to Germany from Eastern and Central Europe and the 
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(former) Soviet Union.
32
 In view of the generous nature of the West German citizenship 
law vis-à-vis ethnic Germans, it is hardly surprising that the impression gained 
prominence that Germany was indeed welcoming its diaspora “home”. The expellee 
organizations (Landsmannschaften) further contributed to constructing the image of a 
“homeland” that was warmly welcoming its ethnic minorities from abroad. As the 
following section will show, it was by and large possible to maintain this image until the 
collapse of communism in the late 1980s. 
 
Maintaining the myth of the homeland 
 
It is of particular interest to note that Transylvanian Saxons chose the Federal Republic of 
Germany as their “external homeland”.33 As mentioned above, this was partly due to a 
longer term connection with Germany, but also due to pragmatic reasons and the special 
circumstances created by the new political climate in Cold War Europe. Far from limiting 
the links between West Germany and Romania, the political division in Europe during 
the Cold War in fact strengthened ties with Germany. Visits from relatives and to the 
West, letter writing, and Western goods all contributed to the hardening of specific 
images of the Saxons’ external homeland.34 Furthermore, as more and more Germans left 
Romania, the pressure grew on the dwindling community to follow suit. This then 
culminated in the mass exodus of the 1980s and early 1990s,
35
 which had a “feedback 
effect” (Rückkoppelungseffekt) on the German communities and the infrastructure in 
Romania.
36
 
The cross-border connections and exchanges between Romanian German émigrés 
in Germany and  non-émigrés in Romania generated a rather serene and romanticized 
image of West Germany amongst those Germans still living in Romania. For many 
Saxons, (West) Germany represented both the “free” West and the notion of a 
Kulturnation. The classical works of Goethe, Lessing, or Kleist, combined with Western 
consumerism, helped construct a rather skewed view of Germany and German society. 
Although German books were available in Romania, friends and relatives often brought 
literature with them as gifts. This then added to a heavily romantic image of Germany, 
one which led Siebenbürger Sachsen to imagine Germany “in terms of Goethe and 
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Schiller”.37 Both contemporary sources of the period before mass emigration and 
subsequent interviews with Romanian Germans point to a proliferation of images of an 
historic Germany, which were transposed onto West Germany. While studies have 
highlighted the construction and carriers of said images, particularly though not 
exclusively in the first few decades of the Cold War,
38
 interviews with Saxon émigrés 
have exhibited the same use of such an imagined Germany when recalling the process of 
contemplating emigration.
39
 The FRG was thus used as a point of reference – the GDR 
was excluded from this for political reasons – and as a means to critique their lives in 
communist Romania. Shortage was juxtaposed with abundance, Romanian and “Balkan” 
conduct with German high culture, and surveillance with political freedom.
40
  
 Indeed, these imagined links appeared to be reciprocated by the West German 
government and other institutions. In 1977 the Helmut Schmidt government reached an 
agreement with Romania whereby up to 12,000 Germans (Saxons inclusive) were 
allowed to emigrate from Romania against a payment per person (according to the 
economic “value” of each individual) by the West German government.41 Not only did 
this render the impression that the West German government was welcoming them with 
open arms, but that in fact their “actual homeland”, Romania, was trying to rid itself of its 
German population.  
Moreover, the Landsmannschaft – that is the homeland society of particular ethnic 
German groups in the FRG – had actively been pushing for large-scale emigration as a 
means of “survival”. To be sure, this did not go unchallenged and does indeed shed some 
light on changing perceptions of belonging and identity amongst Transylvanian Saxons 
during the Cold War. Against the backdrop of the attraction of Western consumerism and 
the pressure exerted by the Landsmannschaft, a group called Licht der Heimat (Torch of 
the Homeland), an organization attached to the Lutheran church in Transylvania, argued 
during the 1970s against immigration to Germany.
42
 Intellectuals and representatives 
within this rival organization, such as the eminent pastor Gerhard Möckel, saw 
emigration to West Germany as being the greatest threat to the integrity of the Saxon 
community.
43
 They were particularly concerned by the lure of consumerism and its 
impact on the (spiritual) community of Transylvanian Saxons. Yet the dispute was not 
merely about religiosity and secularism; it was far more concerned with the fundamental 
 12 
question of where the Saxon community belonged. While the Landsmannschaft 
envisaged their external homeland as tantamount to the community’s future, this clerical 
organization insisted on binding the community to Transylvania and its established 
religious institutions.  
Nonetheless, Western consumerism and notions of belonging to the German 
Kulturnation, as well as pragmatic considerations such as financial assistance from the 
West German government and other institutions, tilted that particular debate in favor of 
leaving Romania. Furthermore, living conditions in Romania had deteriorated drastically 
in the 1970s and especially the 1980s.
44
 While images of Germany and the West played a 
very significant role in reconfiguring the Saxon community’s relationship with their 
actual and external homelands, these conditions on the ground greatly contributed 
towards an increased push for emigration. Therefore, during the last decade of the Cold 
War, Saxons began to leave en masse, which culminated in the mass emigration of 
Saxons (and Swabians) at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. The special sense of 
belonging to, not to mention being welcomed by, West Germany was, in the end, too 
strong in the face of the adverse economic and political situation in Romania. Saxons 
emigrated with a “hard image” of Germanness, namely one that was quite specific and 
determined by an ethno-cultural view, coupled with naïve ideas of freedom and choice.  
 
Still a community of Germans? 
 
Whereas West German laws which allowed ethnic Germans to gain full citizenship 
worked well while communist party states in Central and Eastern Europe severely 
restricted the number of ethnic Germans they would allow to emigrate, things became 
more difficult when these restrictions on emigration were eased after 1989. And whereas 
West German policy until 1989 towards ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe 
but also the GDR was mainly concerned with helping as many as the respective regimes 
would allow to migrate to the Federal Republic, usually against hard currency, united 
Germany’s policy towards its diaspora started to concentrate on significantly reducing the 
influx of ethnic German migrants by ensuring that they would be granted minority rights 
in their respective countries and ensuring financial support for initiatives aimed at 
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improving their lives there. This was only in part aimed at helping ethnic Germans 
abroad by stabilizing their situation there, however. It was clearly also self-serving in the 
sense that it was aimed at easing the pressure on Germany’s resources due to the large-
scale migration of ethnic Germans into the country.   
With the collapse of communism in Eastern and Central Europe and German 
unification in 1990, the rationale for keeping ius sanguinis had disappeared. With 
German unification all former GDR citizens had turned into citizens of the Federal 
Republic and with the transition to democracy of the countries in Eastern and Central 
Europe, there was no more need for granting ethnic Germans privileged access to 
Germany on human rights grounds. 
With the large-scale migration of ethnic Germans to the Federal Republic which 
had become possible after the fall of communism, the paradox of Germany’s citizenship 
law based on ius sanguinis had also become ever more apparent since it granted 
descendants of ethnic Germans – whose families might never have set foot in German 
Lands since the twelfth century – German citizenship, whereas Turkish “guest workers” 
who migrated to Germany from the 1960s onwards and their children – even if they were 
actually born in Germany – were unable to gain German citizenship.  
In view of this, a consensus emerged that Germany’s citizenship law had to be 
changed. With the fall of the wall it was considered to be too easy for German Aussiedler 
to gain citizenship and too hard for those immigrants like the Turkish “guest workers” 
who had lived and worked in (West) Germany for decades. Neither the “guest workers” 
themselves nor their children, even if they were born in Germany, were eligible for 
German citizenship. At the same time as the citizenship reforms made it harder for ethnic 
Germans to gain German citizenship, the German government tried to ensure that a 
number of bilateral agreements with Eastern and Central European countries contained 
commitments to the protection of the respective German ethnic minority (between 
Germany and the Soviet Union in 1990; Germany and Poland in 1991; Germany and 
Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia in 1992). 
A number of laws were thus introduced which made migration into Germany 
much harder and also less attractive, and which severely restricted the number of 
Aussiedler migrating into Germany. The Law on the Modification of Integration Benefits 
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(Einwanderungsanpassungsgesetz) of 22 December 1989, for example, reduced the 
benefits for Aussiedler, in particular regarding the entitlement to language courses, 
training and housing. Putting much more stringent criteria on the eligibility for German 
citizenship, the Law on the Acceptance of Aussiedler (Aussiedleraufnahmegesetz) of 28 
June 1990 required potential candidates to apply for the status of Aussiedler while still in 
their country of origin by submitting their application to the local consulate or embassy. 
The form required information and details regarding the applicants’ command of 
German, e.g. whether it was spoken at home. These forms were then passed on to 
Germany where initial decisions were made. Once their status was approved 
provisionally and they were allowed to enter Germany on that basis, their Aussiedler 
status had to be confirmed. Looking at the numbers after 1990, this law appears to have 
had an immediate effect in terms of reducing the influx into Germany. Whereas 1990 still 
saw just over 397,000 Aussiedler gaining German citizenship, in 1991, the figure had 
nearly halved and gone down to around 222,000.
45
 
Most importantly, the War Consequences Conciliation Law 
(Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz, KfbG) of December 1992/January 1993, which 
amended the Federal Expellee Law and created a new category, the Spätaussiedler (“late 
repatriates”), further tightened the conditions to qualify for this status. “Germanness” in 
terms of language skills and the preservation of German culture and customs now had to 
be demonstrated and was to only apply to ethnic Germans who were born before 1 
January 1993. Furthermore, evidence of discrimination was required and conditions for 
relatives of approved and confirmed Spätaussiedler to also migrate to Germany were 
made much more rigorous. In 1996 a further piece of legislation ruled out the free choice 
of place of residence for the initial period of the migrants’ stay.  
On the whole, the measures taken in the early 1990s made it much harder for 
ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe to qualify for German citizenship. On 
the one hand, the criteria to qualify for German citizenship became more stringent and 
the number of Aussiedler that could be admitted annually was capped at 220,000. On the 
other hand, migration was made a lot less attractive since benefits for Aussiedler had 
been significantly reduced, in terms of the financial help to which they were entitled, but 
also in terms of language courses and other programs that used to support their 
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integration in German society.
46
 It is debatable whether these measures achieved the 
desired effect or whether the respective diasporic communities had simply shrunk to a 
degree that more emigration was simply not possible. In any case, numbers have clearly 
been decreasing, especially from those countries that have become members of western 
multilateral institutions like NATO and the EU, e.g. Poland, Hungary, Romania. Whereas 
in 1990 111,150 ethnic Germans still migrated from Romania to Germany, the figure for 
2008 is only 16!
47
 
Furthermore, the German Nationality Act, which was passed in 1999 and came 
into effect in 2000, provided a new understanding of what it means to be German, at last 
leaving behind outdated notions of an organic concept of citizenship based on ethnicity. It 
constituted the biggest change to the 1913 citizenship law and its guiding principle, ius 
sanguinis, and finally undertook a long overdue reform to comprehensively liberalize and 
modernize German citizenship in line with other European countries. Even though it 
made the definition of German citizenship more inclusive for many migrants, it further 
dented the privileged status of ethnic Germans migrating to Germany. On the whole, 
ethnic Germans have lost their privileged status and rather than making their migration to 
Germany easy, governments have concentrated their efforts on supporting the protection 
of German ethnic minorities abroad. 
 
Transylvanian Saxons in the 21st century 
 
The fall of communism has had a dramatic effect not only on the concept of Germanness 
in reunified Germany, but, crucially, on German diaspora communities in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Since the reforms in the 1990s, ethnic Germans in Eastern and Central 
Europe and the former Soviet Union have found it very difficult to migrate to Germany. 
In contrast to the Cold War period, they have lost their privileged status as migrants into 
(West) Germany. The mass exodus of ethnic Germans from Eastern and Central Europe 
and the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s casts severe doubt over the 
continued existence or survival of these communities, even though the German 
government continues to show commitment towards supporting the minorities.
48
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In contrast to relations with Poland and the Czech Republic, Romania’s ethnic 
Germans have not contributed to difficult bilateral relations between Romania and 
Germany.
49
 Yet whilst victimhood discourses about deportation and expropriation have 
not played a role in governmental relations, they have begun to play a bigger role among 
Transylvanian Saxon émigrés. In May 2007, a Romanian German organization called 
Restitution in Rumänien e.V. (ResRo) was set up with the aim to regain German property 
that had been dispossessed during the post-war period. The strong focus on land 
ownership and expropriation has been mainly due to the fact that many Saxons were also 
land owners. The organization drafted a petition addressed to the European Parliament, 
among other organizations, in which they called for a return of German property.
50
 While 
the Romanian government has passed laws on the return of property expropriated by the 
communist government irrespective of ethnicity from 1948 onwards, ResRo has 
identified this as a specifically German problem by couching it in terms of Romanian 
dispossession of German property, irrespective of ideology or government. By tapping 
into notions of human rights, Transylvanian Saxons have continued the Cold War 
narrative of needing to address the lack of human rights in the East through institutions in 
the West. More importantly, however, it has also signaled something entirely different: 
Despite the fact that the majority of Saxons had decided to migrate to (West) Germany – 
with its image of being both an historic and affluent country – following a good decade of 
integration, Transylvanian Saxons have also begun to turn their attention back to their 
ancestral homeland, Transylvania.  
 Far from encountering the land of Goethe and Schiller, many Saxons came across 
a “westernized” country that did not resemble the image that had been conjured up during 
the Cold War (and in fact predated that period, too). The affluence for which many 
yearned was gradually reinterpreted as decadence, and the contemporary culture they 
witnessed was viewed with skepticism.
51
 More important, however, were the contrasting 
and often contradictory memories many Saxon émigrés were confronted with. Having left 
what many perceived to be an anti-German environment in which anti-fascism 
determined public discourses on the past, the majority of émigrés arrived in (West) 
Germany during the “boom” of Holocaust memory.52 This has proved to be a slightly 
perplexing experience for some Saxons, as this has been interpreted as a challenge to 
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their own strong notion of victimhood and their depoliticized memory of Saxon 
involvement during the war. Moreover, the absence of a critical forum in which to 
discuss, publicly at least, experiences during communism in Romania has left sections of 
the émigré community feeling marginalized in reunified Germany.  
The response to this has been varied: One option has been to retreat into online 
forums devoted to matters of interest for Transylvanians.
53
 Tellingly, these online 
discussions have tended to centre on issues in their former homeland Romania and not so 
much on current developments in Germany, even though the majority of users live in 
Germany.
54
 A number of Saxons have expressed a real desire for a return to their roots in 
Transylvania “offline”, too. This has come to the fore not by moving back to Romania – 
the number of returnees has been largely insignificant – but rather through a greater 
engagement with their former homeland. While the appearance of so-called 
Sommersachsen (“Summer Saxons”) in Transylvania has been a source of humor, other 
involvement in initiatives such as ResRo or cultural events such as Sibiu/Hermannstadt 
2007 has had a distinctive cultural-political edge.
55
 Programs such as Sibiu 2007 have not 
just been about celebrating the Saxon heritage, but have constituted a broader trend 
amongst Saxons to “rediscover” Transylvania and assert economic and cultural leverage 
over their former homeland.
56
  
In addition to this, the emergence of prominent Romanian German figures such as 
Herta Müller (albeit Swabian), the winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2009, or 
Klaus Johannis, the Saxon mayor of Sibiu and erstwhile Prime Ministerial candidate in 
2009, seemed to have swayed the émigré community away from German matters and 
closer to their former homeland. Even Saxons who have been thoroughly integrated into 
German society have been turning their attention to Romania once again. The rock star 
Peter Maffay appears to have rediscovered his Saxon roots, despite being apparently fully 
integrated, by expressing an interest to buy a fortified Saxon church in Transylvania. This 
has been viewed as part of his “social engagement” (soziales Engagement) with the 
region.
57
 Since Saxons have not really had to contend with problems of integration in 
Germany, the reasons for this reinvention of Romania must therefore lie elsewhere. 
Certainly the increasing emergence of “transnational awareness” in projects such as 
heritage conservation has played its part.
58
 It is also true to say that prominent figures 
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such as Peter Maffay have contributed towards a greater responsiveness amongst Saxon 
émigrés in Germany towards their previous homeland.
59
 Yet at the heart of this 
reimagining lies the breakdown of previously established images of Germany following 
emigration.  
 What does this tell us about shifting notions of citizenship and identity in the 
Berlin Republic? First of all, it points to the fact that this renegotiating of the Saxon 
relationship with Germany and Romania is not merely a form of nostalgia – that is the 
longing for a bygone era – but about the physical constitution of their former homeland. 
Unlike phenomena such as Ostalgie in the former GDR where the past is reimagined as a 
critique of the present, Saxon re-engagement with Romania has not been about 
rehabilitating the past.
60
 The loss of homeland thus also refers to the physical and not just 
temporal loss of it. This has been echoed in a large number of publications on the natural 
geography and architecture of Saxon Transylvania.
61
 Saxons are remembering the 
appearance of Saxon Transylvania as a counterpoint to the urban experience in (West) 
Germany in much the same way that West Germany acted as a counterpoint to their 
experiences in Romania. Whilst West Germany was once an idealized version of an 
historic Germany, Transylvania has, to some extent, become re-imagined as a place 
bound up with a harmonious past.
62
 Exploring Rogers Brubaker’s model of a minority’s 
triangular relationship with its external and actual homelands a little further, the case of 
Transylvanian Saxons suggests that home has always been located elsewhere.
63
 Their role 
as a minority has led Saxons to retain a certain distance towards their respective actual 
homeland (be it Romania or Germany). Home is thus never the actual homeland, but the 
other, external and imagined homeland. It is in this context that Romania and (in 
particular) Transylvania has become such a focal point for the émigré community of 
Saxons in Germany. 
Yet this reimagining of a lost homeland has not merely been about the loss of 
territory. It has also served as a commentary on the disappointment which sections of the 
émigré community have experienced since immigration to Germany. As discussed above, 
Transylvanian Saxons left Romania with the distinct impression of being subjected to an 
anti-German public narrative.
64
 However, whilst Saxons had expected a wave of 
sympathy from fellow Germans, they quickly found themselves lumped in with right-
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wing revisionist circles and discourses in the latter stages of the Cold War. Stories of 
German victimhood existed rather more on the margins of public discourse. Instead, 
perpetrator stories and memories appeared to receive most attention in the public domain 
towards the end of the Cold War. Since then, reunified Germany has been marked by 
fragmented and often competing – perceived or otherwise – narratives and identities, and 
it is within this memory landscape that Transylvanian Saxons have been able to reassert 
their stories and identity discourses. Having seemingly escaped the “backward” East, the 
last two decades have been characterized by deeper European integration, which has, in 
turn, seemingly undermined their decision to leave Romania in the first place. The 
reaction to this has been twofold. On the one hand, Saxon narratives of Romania have 
hardened and they have reaffirmed their views on the “backwardness” of Romania.65 On 
the other hand, Europeanization has also signaled to many Saxons the apparent need for 
their return to Transylvania. As such, Saxons have frequently portrayed themselves as a 
bridge between East and West.
66
 Their key role has therefore been understood as actors in 
Romania and not in their new homeland Germany. 
Finally, it is worth noting that Germany is a very different country to what it was 
during the Cold War period. “New” immigrants from Turkey and elsewhere have 
challenged and in fact altered older perceptions of an ethnic and ethno-cultural 
“Germanness”. For Saxon émigrés, particularly of the first and second generation, this 
has posed some difficulties and, as outlined above, has led to a realignment and re-
identification (however vexed it may be) with their former homeland. Maybe somewhat 
surprisingly, neither the newly-gained prominence of Romanian Germans in Germany – 
Herta Müller, Eginald Schlattner, Klaus Johannis, Hagen Rether – nor the renewed 
interest in German victimhood in Germany seem to have had any major impact on the 
way sections of the émigré community view their position in Germany. Though it is 
perhaps premature to anticipate the full effect Herta Müller’s critical and renowned work 
might have on images and perceptions, Saxon identity and notions of Germanness in the 
21
st
 century still seem to suffer from a mutual disconnect. While there does seem to be 
more space for the “critical engagement” with the past that many Saxons have been 
calling for, the émigré community itself seems once again torn between two homelands 
and various strands of identity. In so doing, they have moved from diaspora to diaspora. 
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Perhaps the Landsmannschaft’s ominous prediction of Finis Saxonae (the end of the 
Saxons) during the Cold War has been proved right after all.  
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